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Faculty and Deans

Fifty-one Chief Justices
By WILLIAm F. SWINDLER* *
TnE LEGACY OF WiLLiAM HowAiRD TAT
If there is a single figure in twentieth century jurisprudence
in the United States who may be called the godfather of law
reform and modernization, it perhaps would be William Howard
Taft. Many would argue that a better claimant for the honor
would be Professor Roscoe Pound, not only on the strength of
his famous 1906 address to the American Bar Association, "Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,"'
but for his long and influential career in many areas of law.
Others would urge that the credit should be shared with such
figures as Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt of New Jersey and
with that contemporary crusader for improvement, Mr. Justice
2
Tom C. Clark, late of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The case for Mr. Taft as primus inter pares is based upon
somewhat fortuitous circumstances-particularly, the fact that he
is the only person in the history of the United States to have been
both President and Chief Justice. More important is the fact
that at those points in time-1909-1913 in the one instance, and
1921-1930 in the other-the man and the opportunity to act upon
his interests converged with the public sense of need for reform
and modernization. As a result, Mr. Taft as President was closely
identified with, and in some instances actively assisted in, the
drafting and adoption of the first national criminal code (1909)
and a comprehensive revision of the civil code (1911); while as
* From a paper delivered before the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies,

University of London, March 6, 1972. To be published in a forthcoming volume
tentatively entitled CuRmENT ISSUES IN AMERICAN JUDICATURE.

** Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary; Coordinator, National Conference on the Judiciary (1971).
I R. POUND, CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION

oF JUSTICE. This classic has been reprinted many times in many media, but the
separate leaflet edition kept in stock by the American Judicature Society is the
most readily accessible medium.
2 On Clark, see Frank, Justice Tom Clark and Judicial Administration, 46 TEx.
L. Riv. 5 (1967); on Vanderbilt, see Williams, Arthur T. Vanderbilt and Legal
Education, 24 N.Y.U. L.Q. 1 (1949).
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Chief Justice he organized a judicial lobby for a three-fold program of statutory reform of judicial administration, two parts of
which were enacted (1922, 1925) in his tenure.'
Added to these considerations is the further fact that Taft
was an articulate spokesman for these and other reforms in
American judicature. He is remembered in American history as a
reluctant President and a constitutional conservative, in a time
of constitutional ferment and a demand for executive activism.
Thus his administration of the Presidency will doubtless always
suffer by comparison with the flamboyant administration of his
predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, and the messianic posture of his
successor, Woodrow Wilson. His years between the White House
and the Supreme Court were nominally academic-he was offered
a professorship at Yale University primarily as a springboard for
a continuing series of public addresses and writings, and during
this period he served (1913-14) as president of the American
Bar Association. It was during this time that he made his principal pilgrimage to the sources of the common law, and returned
to the United States confirmed in his earlier conclusions that
English procedural and substantive reforms offered many appropriate models for American law.4
Thus it was that, in the fall of 1921, William Howard Taft
eagerly assumed the administrative responsibilities of the office
of Chief Justice of the United States. The law, and particularly
the judicial process, had always been his consuming interest,
and the office of Chief Justice the goal toward which he had
pointed with unabashed ambition. For most of the preceding
fifteen years, he had been working, writing and ruminating on the
needs and opportunities for modernization in the organization
of justice in the United States. Not that he was zealous for change
in every quarter; he was convinced that current pressures toward
a so-called "broad construction" of the Constitution were wrong,
and he injected himself gratuitously into the executive prerogative
of selecting nominees for the Supreme Court in order to insure
that a majority of constitutional conservatives might resultY But
3 See Swindler, The Chief Justice and Law Reform, 1921-1971, 1971 Sup. Cr.
REv. 4241, 248 (1971).
See H. PIUNGLE, LiFE AND TnEs OF WILLAim HOWAmD TArr 1000-06
(1939).
5 See A. MASON, CmyF JUSTICE WLIAm HowAD TAFT ch. 3 (1964); W.
SWINDLER, Ti OLD LEGALrrY, 1888-1932 ch. 13 (1969).
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in the matter of administrative modernization of the federal
judiciary, he was by all standards in advance of his time.
Judicial administration in the United States is complicated,
and doubtless always will be complicated, by the existence of
fifty-one judicial systems-one for each of the states and one for
the federal govenment-as well as a scattering of special courts
in certain territories. The original theory, of course, was that
each state system would concern itself with matters within its
specific jurisdiction, and the federal courts would concern themselves with adjudication of inter-state matters, interpretation of
federal law and the Constitution of the United States, and questions of international law in which the United States and its
citizens might be involved. As a matter of literal truth, of course,
practice in the main follows the original theory; but that hardly
disposes of the basic problems of administration of justice in the
American federal system. From the beginning, diversity jurisdiction-the federal court being the most congenial forum for a
suit by a citizen of one state against a citizen of another-brought
rights under state law into federal courts for adjudication. 6 Conto
versely, state courts from the earliest times seldom hesitated
7
take jurisdiction in certain cases which involved federal law.
By the end of the nineteenth centuly, these crossovers between
state and federal courts constituted only one of a number of
complicating factors in the administration of justice. The original
Congressional enactment on the subject-the judiciary Act of
1789-bad created a two-level system of federal trial courts (District Courts and Circuit Courts) as well as the "one Supreme
Court" stipulated by the Constitution. Without discussing in
detail the conflicts which arose out of this two-level trial system,
it is enough to point out that by 1891, when an intermediate
appellate court system was engrafted onto the original structure,
the volume of business in the federal courts had proliferated.
Largely this was a consequence of the steady increase in federal
statute law, and particularly the sudden broadening of subjectareas of federal jurisdiction as a result of the post-Civil War
amendments to the Constitution.'
0 See F. FnANFnmm & J. LANDIs, THE BusnusS OF THE St r~mm CoLIr
89, 94, 293 (1927).
7 Id. at 61, 189.
s id. at ch. 11.
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One result of this proliferation of judicial business in the
federal system was the threatened breakdown of the appellate
process. In 1891, when Congress created the Circuit Courts of
Appeal to offer relief to the Supreme Court, the latter was struggling under a load of fifteen hundred cases a year, but of these,
only about five hundred could actually be disposed of. By vesting
in the intermediate courts final jurisdiction in certain types of
cases, and by limiting the reviewable questions in appeals of right
in other cases, it was hoped that the load of appellate business
might be efficaciously redistributed. Twenty years later, in the
Judicial Code of 1911, a reform of the trial court structure was
effected by merging the old District Courts and Circuit Courts
into a single level of District Courts of general jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Taft, however, perceived that this reorganization
required more before it could be considered efficient. What was
needed, he insisted-more strongly than ever after his visit to
England-was a unified federal court system. His three basic
ingredients in such a reform, as he advocated them upon ascending
the high bench, were (1) a system for annual statistical reports
on docket loads in all trial courts in the federal judiciary, with
concomitant authority to transfer and reassign federal trial judges
in accordance with the variations in these loads; (2) a statutory
limitation on the appellate responsibilities of the Supreme Court
by substantially broadening the final jurisdiction of the intermediate courts and also broadening the subjects over which the
Supreme Court could exercise discretionary (certiorari) jurisdiction; and (8) authority in the Supreme Court to draft and
promulgate uniform rules of procedure for the entire federal
judicial system.0 Taft prevailed upon Congress to enact his first
reform in 1922, and the second in 1925. It was not until the latter
years of the Chief Justiceship of Charles Evans Hughes, however,
that the third part of Taft's legacy was effectuated by Congress
in a legislative struggle which extended from 1938 to 1940.10
In addition to completing Taft's program of reform, Chief
Justice Hughes contributed the leadership to create a fourth,
fundamentally important ingredient of modernization. This was
9
Taft, Adequate Machinery for Judicial Business, 7 A.B.A.J. 453 (1921);
Taft, Three Needed Steps of Progress, 8 A.B.A.J. 34 (1922).
10 Swn LER, supra note 5, at ch. 16.
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the concept of an Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, a management agency which Congress established by
statute in 1939. With the addition of a research and training
agency in the Federal Judicial Center in 1967, and the 1971
legislation providing for court administrators for each of the
eleven judicial circuits of the United States, the machinery of a
unified federal court system, after fifty years of statutory enactments, may be considered to be assembled in fairly complete
1
form.
While the mechanism for judicial efficiency has thus slowly
been constructed over this half century, however, two problems
of dismaying magnitude have also been developing. One is
represented in the great "sunbursts" of Congressional enactments
which have created a vast new catalog of litigable issues which
the federal courts must attempt to handle; in the New Deal
period of the 1930's and in the "Great Society" period of the
1960's, literally scores of new federal rights-in labor relations,
social welfare, economic benefits, civil liberties, defendants'
remedies-have been created by statute or landmark constitutional decisions. The number of these which are reviewable as
of right in the Supreme Court has grown in geometric ratio, so
that the relief once thought to have been perpetuated in the broad
2
certiorari legislation of 1925 has all but become neutralized.
The second problem represents a crisis in the fifty-one-jurisdictional aspect of American federalism. It is the problem of the
state judicial systems, and the fact that in most instances there
has been nothing like the systematic, progressive process of construction of a modem unified court structure which has been
carried on over the past half-century at the federal level. This
is to say that, in the states, while the volume of judicial business
has been proliferating in a degree rather comparable with the
volume in the federal courts, the capabilities of the state court
systems have not been correspondingly developed. This is to say
even more-that with the menacing prospect of a collapse of the
state machinery, the burdens upon the federal machinery will
11 Swindler, supra note 3, at 265.
12 See reports of the Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics of the
Judicial Conference of the United States in REPORT OF TE ADmImSTRATIVE
OFFICE OF TM UNITED STATES CoURTS (1970).
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enormously increase. This is so for many reasons, most of which
may be summarized in the fact of the centripetal thrust of the
political economy of the United States in the past thirty years,
which has created what is now described as a "unitary federalism"
of interdependent state and federal relationships.' 3
There have been those who discerned this developing problem
in the state judicial systems over the years. Vanderbilt of New
Jersey was the most eloquent voice in the wilderness, and his
Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration,14 published in
1949, represented a guidebook which has been only occasionally
followed. The American Judicature Society, the pioneer professional association seeking to educate the public and the bench
and bar to the urgency of modernization, has made herculean
efforts, but the Augean stables have not yet been cleansed. Under
the sponsorship of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a federal agency created in 1968 to direct the flow of Congressional appropriations into state programs for law reform in
general, a National Conference on the Judiciary was called in
1970 to invite an assessment of the crisis by the highest judicial
officers from all of the fifty states.
It is significant that the present Chief Justice of the United
States, Warren E. Burger, as well as the President of the United
States, came to this national conference of state court leaders to
stress the urgency of action. Mr. Nixon, the first active member
of the bar to occupy the White House since Mr. Taft, perceived
as well as the Chief Justice how critical to the well-being of the
entire federal structure, as much as to the federal judicial structure, was the early and thoroughgoing reform of the state judicial
systems. Congress, in its enactment in 1968 of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, had declared the purpose of the
statute to be "to assist State and local governments in reducing
the incidence of crime" by promoting greater efficiency in criminal
justice systems "at all levels of government." 5 While the early
phases of the administration of this act-and the disbursement
of several billions of dollars annually to the individual states13

Miller, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Su. CT. REv. 199

(1968).

14 A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS
(1949).
15 42 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. (1970).

OF JUDICIAL ADMnnsTRATION passim
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emphasized police training and equipment, by the time of the
National Conference on the Judiciary the agency charged with
the administration, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), had come to acknowledge that criminal justice
was inseparable from the whole system of justice, and until the
whole system was modernized the criminal justice sector would
be ineffectively treated.
The National Conference settled upon certain fundamentals
in its final consensus statement; in effect, many of these were
simply renewed declarations of long familiar principles, given
enlarged importance by the general agreement that crisis was at
hand.' 6 Because of the pervasiveness of the crisis, it was evident
that a coordinated campaign for reform-rather than reliance on
faith in the initiative of fifty individual states-would be necessary.
Finally, to devise such a coordinated campaign, two agencies
were required: a clearing house for information and programs to
serve all fifty jurisdictions among the states; and a single national
figure to provide the leadership for the campaign. The first
agency was created, as a consequence of the resolutions adopted
at the National Conference, and is now in operation as the National Center for State Courts. The second rather obviously
could only be one official-the Chief Justice of the United States;
for, if state judicial modernization has an intimate bearing upon
the efficacy of federal judicial administration, there is only one
among the fifty-one chief justices who can command the attention

of all.
With this state of affairs in the winter of 1971-72, the role of
the Chief Justice of the United States has fundamentally enlarged
-and enlarged considerably beyond anything which William
Howard Taft had envisioned. Taft, and Hughes who followed
him, concerned themselves with establishing the essential powers
or offices through which to develop a unified federal court system.
Chief Justice Earl Warren developed the Judicial Conference of
the United States into an agency of continuing study of basic
administrative problems within the unified system.' 7 But from
Taft to Warren, it was only the federal system with which the
16 Consensus Statement of the National Conference on the Judiciary, JusTicE
IN THE
7 STATES 265 (Swindler ed. 1971).

' See Swindler, supra note 3, at 253.
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Chief Justice considered himself obliged to deal. Early in the
tenure of the present Chief Justice-and not, rather obviously,
from any choice of his-the long-delayed modernization of all or
most of the fifty state judicial systems became a cardinal item on
the agenda.
The logic of the situation points to the propriety of the Chief
Justice of the United States concerning himself with problems
of non-federal systems of courts-but the rules of law and politics
drastically limit his practical opportunities for leadership. Even
if their career toward ultimate breakdown threatens the integrity
or even survival of the federal system, the ultimate decision to
halt their own deterioration can come only from within each
state, acting independently of the federal government as well as
independently of each other. Relations between the Chief Justice
of the United States and the chief justices of the fifty states have,
within recent memory, been strained, to say the least. The current
circumstances encourage a sense of mutuality of interest, but the
insistence upon total freedom of each state from the federal
authority in this area calls for diplomatic virtuosity on the part
of the legatee of Chief Justice Taft.
THE ANALOGY OF THE LoRD CHANCELLOR

With this trend of events in judicial organization in the United
States, there has been some fulminating on the part of critical
observers of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court that circumstances were translating the leadership responsibilities of the
Chief Justice into a function analogous to the judicial role of the
Lord Chancellor. As one leading American scholar has put it:
The Lord Chief Justice is confined to judicial tasks. The
Lord Chancellor, in fact, has no time for his judicial duties.
It is not irrelevant, therefore, that the Lord Chancellor is
turned out of office with each change of government, although
the Lord Chief Justice holds office for life.
There is an inconsistency between the judicial role and the
political one that is, in practice, thus recognized by the English
Constitution.
In the United States, we have made no provision for a
Lord Chancellor. We have only a Chief Justice. Customarily,
the Chief Justice-in his public stance at least-has confined
himself to the duties of presiding over the most important
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judicial tribunal in the world. That job is itself a challenge
even to the highest capacities of the greatest of lawyers:
witness John Marshall, Roger Taney, and Charles Evans
Hughes.
Occasionally, as was the case with Chief Justice Taft, and
as seems to be the case now with Chief Justice Burger, the
occupant of the Court's center seat regards himself as more
of a Lord Chancellor than a mere Lord Chief Justice. His
self-appointed role then becomes adviser to legislative and
executive branches, sponsor and critic of judicial appointments, creator of law reforms brought about without either
legislative or judicial authority.18
There are, of course, two sources for such a complaint, stemming from the American insistence upon the most literal and
complete separation of powers in two respects-the separation of
the judicial function from the executive, and the separation of
the federal function from that of the states. If the critics of the
current course of events in American justice are to be taken
literally, there would be an apparent prospect that the Chief
Justice in undertaking to lead both federal and state courts into
a concerted and coordinated program of modernization and
reform would not only be trenching upon the federal executive
and legislative prerogative on the one hand and the independent
position of the states on the other; but he would also be defining
a new function in the federal government which would in fact
enlarge upon the analogy of the Lord Chancellor.
Before exploring the realities of this prospect, it may be
pertinent to establish several introductory propositions, viz.:
(1) Whether or not the analogy of the Lord Chancellor is
apposite, the fact remains that the responsibility for centralizing the leadership of law reform must lie somewhere within
the structure of federal government in the United States.
(2) The trend toward "unitary federalism" in the United
States in the past thirty-five years-since the forces of the
economic depression of the 1930's and the resultant course of
the New Deal-has established in areas other than the judicial
area a wide range of precedents for developing coordinated
and concerted programs of state-federal activity.
18

Kurland, The Lord Chancellor of the United States, 7 TwrA. 11 (1971).
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(3) The manifest fact of the existence of fifty-one chief
justices in the federal system of the United States insures, as
a practical matter, that judicial independence will be preserved.
There is also the personal conviction of the present Chief
Justice that there should be no federal intervention in the
state judicial area, and the practice of the LEAA in placing
federal funds with the respective states, to confirm further
that this separation of powers shall be preserved.
To return to the analogy of the Lord Chancellor, then, it would
appear that the crux of the current criticism of American judicial
affairs is the matter of which division of government should
undertake reform and modernization. To quote again from the
vigorous protest of Professor Kurland:
There is also to be noted the difference between the
judicial role and the legislative role that the Chief Justice
would seem to disregard as he assumes the woolsack of the
Lord Chancellor. The courts, and especially the Supreme
Court, may properly be called upon to decide, in the course of
resolving a case or controversy-the only power conferred on
the judiciary by the Constitution-that Florida need not provide 12-man juries or even unanimous ones.
It is a very big step, one that takes the judiciary beyond its
place, for it to decide that juries in federal courts should not
have 12 members and need not be unanimous. That choice
must be a legislative one, for neither the Constitution nor any
federal law says that juries must be less than 12 or less than
unanimous.
Again, it may well be in the province of the Court to say
that in any particular case the defendant was denied his
right to a speedy trial; it is another to say that all cases pending more than six months must be dismissed. 19
What Professor Kurland, and others who have joined in the chorus,
are arguing is that (1) law reform and modernization must be
effectuated without jeopardizing "the functions of law in a democratic society"-to insure that improving the efficiency of judicial
administration does not negate the basic objective of justice, "to
resolve controversies

19 Id.

. .

by means of reason based on the values
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as expressed by the common will through law."20 These critics

further assert that (2) for the Chief Justice to undertake to add
to his judicial responsibilities the non-judicial, quasi-legislative
responsibilities of improving the administration of the courts is
to invade the legislative area and to assume for the Chief Justice
of the United States the role of the Lord Chancellor of England.
To undertake to meet these criticisms, one should refer again
to the preliminary propositions set out above. One may then proceed to consider the facts (1) that since the organization of the
judicial and executive and legislative functions is constitutionally
different in the United States and Great Britain, one may not
expect to insist upon the same division of responsibilities vis-a-vis
the administration of justice; and (2) that the legislative branch
of the government in the United States-Congress, or the individual state assemblies-have in fact had, and continue to have,
the final power of determining how broad a responsibility for
leadership of the judicial organization should be vested in the
Chief Justice of the United States or the Chief Justice of any
21
individual state.

In quite recent years it had been urged that a periodic "state
of the judiciary" report should be requested of the several chief
justices, as a "state of the union" report is required of the President
and a "state of the commonwealth" report is required or expected
in most cases of the governor of a state. Beginning in 1970, Chief
Justice Burger has delivered two "state of the judiciary" addresses
-to the American Bar Association rather than to Congress; and
in at least two instances state chief justices have made "state of
the judiciary" addresses to their respective legislatures. 22 This
would suggest that, at least in the case of those states where this
practice has become established, the legislative branch affirmatively seeks a report and recommendations from the judicial as
well as from the executive branch.
While Congress has not undertaken a formal audience for the
Chief Justice, it has, since 1948, provided for the communicating
of the business of the federal judiciary, as summarized by the
201d. at

28.

21 Pringle, The Role of the State Chief Justice, JusTicE IN THE STATEs 80

ed. 1971).
(Swindler
22
See Proc. of 23rd Annual Meeting of the Conf. of Chief Justices 8 (1971).
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Administrative Office of the United States Courts and as studied
23
and acted upon by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
The Chief Justice is the agent for making this communication,
which summarizes the rather complex agenda of both the Administrative Office and the Judicial Conference which function under
his direction. Indeed, it is through these two agencies-the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges (now the Judicial Conference of
the United States), created in 1922, and the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, created in 1939-that the principal
administrative work, and the leadership role in improvements in
the judicial process, are effectuated by the Chief Justice with
reference to the federal courts. 24 With a research and training
facility available in the Federal Judicial Center, as previously
suggested, the instruments for reform and modernization in the
federal system are fairly complete.
It remains to inquire what functions of the Lord Chancellor,
whose counterpart appears to some American observers to be
germinating without constitutional or statutory sanction in the
United States, are needed or are performed in various American
governmental agencies. As summarized by Professor Kurland
and his concerned colleagues, these functions include presiding
over the House of Lords in its judicial capacity, over the sittings
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and over the
Chancery Division of the High Court, in addition to an ex officio
function as a member of the Court of Appeal. The Lord Chancellor makes some judicial appointments and recommends others;
finally, he is a member of the executive branch of government, the
liaison between the judicial and legislative branches, and "major
domo for law reform."2 5
Treating these as the primary responsibilities of the Lord
Chancellor as head of the judiciary, certain of the functions may
be disregarded since there is no apposite function in the judicial
system in the United States, at least at the federal court level.
Thus the Lord Chancellor's role in the judicial activity of the
House of Lords or the Privy Council can only roughly be analogized with the rare occasions when the Chief Justice of the
23 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
24

See Swindler, supranote 3, passim.
25 7 HAsBRy's LAws oF ENGLAND 367 (3d ed. Simonds 1954).
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United States, as provided by the Constitution, sits in impeachment proceedings in the United States Senate.26 Since law and
chancery are merged in the federal system, there is not, of course,
any special presiding role which any officer of the government of
the United States would have in respect of equity procedures.
The more important functions at which certain American
criticisms of the Chief Justice's administrative activities are aimed
are those which in Professor Kurland's words involve "adviser to
legislative and executive branches, sponsor and critic of judicial
appointments, [and] creator of law reforms brought about without either legislative or judicial authority."
The relationship between the Chief Justice of the United
States-or in some instances, particularly in the third term of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, between Associate Justices-and
the White House has varied with the individual personalities of
the Presidents, and sometimes of the jurists. Chief Justice Taft
unabashedly intermeddled in White House concerns with respect
to Supreme Court appointments, although the manifest intellectual limitations of President Harding all but invited such
advising by Taft and others on many subjects. For the most
part, however, the invitation for counseling has been initiated by
the White House: Franklin D. Roosevelt solicited advice from
both Chief Justice Hughes and several of the New Deal appointees as Associate Justices; Woodrow Wilson had occasional
recourse to Justice Louis D. Brandeis, both before and after his
going onto the bench; Lyndon B. Johnson, as may be recalled,
added to the subsequent travail of Justice Abe Fortas by relying
on him as virtually private legal counsel in several instances.27
As for Congress, Taft's overzealousness in lobbying for the
so-called "Judges' Bill" which eventually saw piecemeal enactment in 1922 and 1925, generated a reaction which became a
contemporary tradition against unsolicited advice from the judiciary. To be sure, when the Chief Justice delivers a "state of
the judiciary" address to the American Bar Association, Congress
reads about it-as Congress also reads about speeches of the
President which are not directly addressed to itself. Yet the
judiciary studiously avoids gratuitous comments. The articulate
I, § 3.
27 See W. Swnwnma, Tm NEw LE ALTY, 1932-1968 ch. 16 (1970).
26 U.S. CONST. art.
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role of the present Chief Justice has been dictated by a conviction
which is widely held, to judge from the recurrent theme of the
National Conference on the Judiciary and the preamble of the
2
Congressional enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control Bill,
that prompt and innovative leadership is needed in the current
crisis of justice in the United States.
The alternative to an assumption by the Chief Justice of certain
tasks of the Lord Chancellor-assuming arguendo that this is in
truth the ultimate effect of the sequence of activities which has
been described-is to look for a non-judicial officer in the government of the United States who may assume these tasks. Such an
officer in the present structure of American government could
only be the Attorney General, who is a Cabinet Officer by virtue
of his being the head of the Department of Justice.2 9 To suggest

such an alternative, however, is unrealistic for several reasons.
In the first place, neither the original concept nor the historical
experience of this office vests in it the type of authority over the
judicial process which would be required. In the second place,
the Attorney General is more often than not-and certainly he
has been in the case of Mr. John N. Mitchell-a key political
lieutenant of the Chief Executive, a circumstance rather different
from the fact that the tenure of the Lord Chancellor is coincident
with the life of the government of which he is a part30 Most
important, however, is the basic fact that neither law nor politics
would make this officer of the federal government acceptable as
a leader of the modernization programs of the fifty state judiciaries. We come back to the basic truism: if the Chief Justice of
the United States cannot enlist the cooperation of fifty other chief
justices, no one else can.
PROSPECTS FOR A FEDERALIST JUDICATURE

The present posture of judicature in the American federalist
system may thus be described accurately as fifty-one systems,
made independent of each other by law and politics, but bonded
28

29

(1937).

42 U.S.C. § 3701 (1970).
See Comment in CUMMNs & McFAnLAND, FEDERAL JusTicE 25-26, 512-13

30 Mr. Mitchell, as predicted by political observers, did in fact resign the
Attorney Generalship in the spring of 1972 to direct President Nixon s reelection
campaign.
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together with increasing firmness by socio-economic realities.
What affects one affects all, in varying degrees; this has been the
consistent history of national affairs for the past four decades in
the United States, in contradistinction to the tradition of state
independence and limited federal authority in the century of
westward settlement. In the economic collapse of the 1930's,
only the federal government appeared to have the resources and
authority to rescue the states in their distress, while the concerted
effort demanded of the nation in the war and postwar period of
the 1940's strengthened the reliance upon the central government.
The Eisenhower administration of the 1950's protested that it
sought a reorientation of state and federal initiatives, but it lacked
a persuasive program for bringing this about, and the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations of the 1960's adhered to a once and
future "Great Society" which essentially implied a centralized
surveillance.
It is against this political background that the presumably
non-political functions of both state and federal judicial administration have developed in this same period of time. There are
several other analogies which are pertinent. There is the uniform
laws movement which has been sponsored by the states since
the end of the last century, a recognition of the fact that in an
increasingly integrated political economy it is essential that the
legal regime of the most essential interstate activities be as
uniform in all jurisdictions as is possible. 31 Complementing this
interstate legislative drafting program is the work toward modernizing and rendering more generally uniform the common law
of the several states, which for half a century has been carried
on by the American Law Institute. 2
The moral to all of this is not that federalism, and a vigorous
system of state government, is gone beyond recovery; it is simply
that the federalism required for the last part of the twentieth
century-and most emphatically for the judicial function in a
federalist system-is a planned program rather than a theory. The
theory degenerated into a shibboleth expressed in catchphrases
31
See Swindler, Law Reform in the Common Law Countries, 13 WM. & MARY
L. Thv.
3 2 258 (1971).
See GOoDRIcH & WOLKIN, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN LAw INSTrTuTE,
1928-1961 (1961).
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like "state sovereignty" or "states' rights"; to face up to reality in
the present, one must speak rather of state responsibility-for it has
been largely because of default in respect of manifest responsibility that the states have lost the initiative in much of the politicoeconomic sphere to the national government. This, too, is part of
the background to the current conviction, expressed in the consensus of the National Conference on the Judiciary, that the
state judicial systems must be overhauled and modernized in
33
order to redistribute the load of judicial services.
Thus we come back to the matter of fifty-one chief justices,
and the propriety of one exhorting the other fifty to put their
houses in order. It may be asked at the outset, what the principal
judicial officer in each of these states has been about in recent years.
The answer may be found in such imperfect sources as the annual
reports of state judicial councils and conferences, or the writings
of individual jurists, or the observations of leaders in professional
societies and scholarly agencies, or the work of the chief justices
themselves in annual convocations.
The Conference of Chief Justices, organized in 1949, was
intended to mobilize the common interests of the state judiciaries
and integrate them into a systematic campaign for modernization.
It is associated with the Council of State Governments, which is
itself a clearing-house for information and programs among the
several states and financially supported by them. Its godparent
was the Section on Judicial Administration of the American Bar
Association. Although it thus had auspicious associations from
the outset, it has only been in recent years that the Conference
has begun to work effectively toward improvement of judicial
administration. This is because, from the latter 1950's to the latter 1960's, its energies were dissipated by the virulent ideological
disputes which it precipitated among its members with reference
to the trends of constitutional decision in the Supreme Court
under Chief Justice Warren.3 4 In 1958 it adopted the resolution
proposed by its special Committee on Federal-State Relationships
as Affected by Judicial Decisions, which urged the Supreme
Court of the United States to show greater self-restraint "by
recognizing and giving effect to the difference between that
See Pringle, supra note 21.
34 Proc. of 10th Annual Meeting of the Conf. of Chief Justices 26 (1958).
33
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which, on the one hand, the Constitution may prescribe or permit,
and that which, on the other, a majority of the Supreme Court,
as from time to time constituted, may deem desirable or undesirable."35
Both before and after this 1958 resolution, the Conference had
been agitated by the tenor of federal Supreme Court decisions
on the so-called "Fifth Amendment cases" of the McCarthy era.
But the issue which churned the waters into a fury was represented in the series of legislative reapportionment cases which
began with Baker v. Carrin 1962.36 In concert with the Council of
State Governments and other affiliates of that agency, the Conference gave comfort and support, and much of its energy, to a
surreptitious move to introduce proposals of constitutional amendment into Congress, which in their extreme form would have
reduced the federal organization of the United States to a confederation analogous to the ineffective organization which had
prevailed from 1781 to 1789. When this maneuver was exposed,
the various "states' rights" groups with which the Conference
had become thus entangled kept up a clandestine campaign to
petition for a new federal constitutional convention, where
37
extremists hoped to accomplish the same purpse.
This review of recent state-federal politics is pertinent as
showing why the Conference of Chief Justices has not moved
ahead more quickly on the business for which presumably it was
organized. It is also pertinent as indicating the extraordinary tact
which now must be demanded of the present Chief Justice in
building a new bridge of communication and joint effort for the
purpose of court reform. Finally, it is relevant in demonstrating
the not-so-latent instinct for resistance to "creeping federalism"
which various critics have discerned in the developing role of the
Chief Justice as the leader of efforts at court modernization.
Meantime, however, there have been other laborers in the
vineyard. Aside from the general professional services of the
American Judicature Society, the pioneer organization in the field,
there has been the work of a major research agency, founded in
1952 by the late Chief Justice Vanderbilt of New Jersey as the
35 See SwnmLER, supra note
36 369

U.S. 186 (1961).

27, at 230, 250.

37 SNVNDLER, supra note 27, at

324.
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Institute of Judicial Administration. As this agency now completes its second decade, it can properly point to a long list of
informative studies into the court systems of many of the states
where it has been invited to work. Early in its history it helped
to initiate a series of training seminars for state appellate judges.
The National Association of Attorneys General-like the Conference of Chief Justices, an affiliate of the Council of State Governments-has offered a potential complementary program to
that of the Conference, although like the Conference it was
diverted from its primary purpose during the ideological furor of
the 1950's and 1960"s.38 The National Council on Crime and
Deliquency is one of a number of special-interest agencies which
have also appeared on the scene.
In a sense, the proliferation of these groups has created an
obvious problem of coordination. The standard American response to such a problem has been to create yet another agency
for that purpose, and this occurred in the early 1960's when the
Joint Committee for the Effective Administration of Justice was
established, under the chairmanship of that indefatigable and
ubiquitous crusader for state and federal reforms, Mr. Justice
Tom C. Clark of the Supreme Court of the United States (now
retired) .1 It would be fair to say that the piers for that necessary
bridge to state-federal understanding were founded on the warm
personality and broad practical understanding of Justice Clark;
he is manifestly the latest in the line which extends from Pound
in 1906 through Taft in 1922-25 to Vanderbilt in 1952. When the
plans were first laid for the National Conference on the Judiciary
-the largest assemblage of state judicial personnel in the nation's
history-all who were responsible agreed that the key to its
success lay in Justice Clark's assumption of the national chairmanship.
Out of that Conference, as has already been pointed out, an
even more promising agency for coordination of efforts at state
modernization has evolved. This is the National Center for State
Courts, created in the summer of 1971 and now operational in
several programs.40 One of its early objectives is the development
3s
39
40

Id. at 345.

See generally Frank, supra note 2.
Holden, National Center for State Courts, in Summary of 28rd Annual
Meeting of the Conf. of Chief Justices 14 (1971).
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of a site and a physical facility where representatives of these
various organizations can permanently work together. Again, in
the early stages of the National Center's organization, there has
been an articulate policy of avoidance of too-close identification
with federalism, at the same time that it has been recognized that
this National Center for the fifty states must and should cooperate
regularly with its counterpart in the federal judicial system, the
Federal Judicial Center.
One may discern, at this point in the evolution of a federalstate program of court modernization, both the things which
need to be done in order to effectuate this program and also the
hope that it may be possible to see that they are done. The
emotional upheaval which resulted from the reapportionment
and defendants' rights decisions of the Supreme Court in the
1960's has gradually subsided, although there are still some
lingering prospects that a twentieth-century constitutional convention may be demanded. The crisis of the spirit which revolved
about the Supreme Court from raffaire Fortas until the disposition
of the question of his replacement seems also to have passed,
although some Court watchers are grumbling about judicial
candor and logic. 41 An olive branch was extended by the Conference of Chief Justices at its summer meeting in 1971, in the
form of a resolution which "heartily endorse[d] the efforts of the
Chief Justice of the United States to improve the channels of
communication between the state and federal courts," and specifically approved the Chief Justice's suggestion of the previous
year, that joint state-federal judicial councils be established.4 In recent years, the Conference of Chief Justices has heard
reports from several of its committees on matters of federal-state
relations, e.g., the matter of post-conviction remedies, the criteria
for establishing a division of jurisdiction between state and
federal courts, and the problems of effecting a reform of the
criminal law in the United States.4 In several instances the
Conferences committee has worked in formal or informal relation41
See Dersbowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on
the Candor
and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971).
42
See Summary of 23rd Annual Meeting of the Conf. of Chief Justices 19
(1971).
43 See Proceedingsof 22nd Annual Meeting of the Conf. of Chief Justices 23
(1970).
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ship with primary study groups, as in the case of the American
Law Institute's study of diversity jurisdiction, and in the case of
the American Bar Association's draft of Standards for Administration of Criminal Justice." The Conference's annual programs are
usually focused upon current issues agitating the American public which have obvious repercussions for the legal system, as in
its consideration of the matter of fair trial and freedom of the
press in 1970, violence and the right to dissent in 1969, and the
consequences for criminal justice of the renowned constitutional
cases beginning with Gideonv. Wainwright45 which were debated
in its 1968 meeting.
The agenda of most other national organizations in American
judicature would be found to be rather similar to those of the
Conference of Chief Justices. They are exchanges of experiences
and information, rather than strategy sessions aimed at a specific
schedule of concerted action; even the draft statutes agreed upon
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws are only recommendations to the respective states by their
authorized representatives on the Commission. There is no
requirement or assurance that the state legislatures will thereafter,
or ever, take up the recommendations and propose their enactment-and, indeed, there is no assurance that the draft "uniform"
46
law will indeed be uniform when and if it is enacted.
In the final analysis-as perhaps was evident from the outseta completely integrated program for court modernization in the
fifty-one jurisdictions in the United States has no practical prospect of achievement in the sense that all will agree to undertake
the same thing at the same time. Law reform, as Justice Vanderbilt once said (and he has been unfailingly quoted), is not for the
short-winded. Persuasion, either by colleagues or by events, is
the only hope for success in any particular phase of reform, and
the process must be repeated for each succeeding phase. To
illustrate: a completely unified court system may be the ideal, as
it is for the American Judicature Society, but it may only come
about in a specific state by piecemeal enactment-first for full44

AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE, STUDY OF Drvnsrry JURISDICTION BznWEF
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1968).
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372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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time rather than part-time courts at the local level; then for merit
selection of judges; then for a procedure for training, discipline,
removal or retirement; then for a general plan of management
techniques applied at both the trial and statewide levels; and
finally, for a chief justice who is truly an effective head of the
entire state court system.
It hardly need be added that a unified court system will not
necessarily be identical in forms in each of the states in which it
may ultimately be developed. Diversity among the states is not a
problem-the problem of the twentieth century has been inaction
and lethargy in the face of mounting pressures upon the existing
judicial system. Even the atomistic tendencies deriving from the
fact that fifty-one systems and fifty-one individual chief justices
are involved, need not frustrate the efforts at general reform if
there is some continuing and attention-commanding plan for such
reform. Once more it comes back to the logic of circumstances
which makes one out of the fifty-one the individual to command
the attention and to focus it upon a continuing plan for reform.

